Ethics? Morals? What is right and what is wrong? What is an
act of good and what constitutes an act of bad? These questions and others
similar to them, are completely subjective and not in the slightest,
tangible. Religions like Christianity,
Islam, and Buddhism have created texts like The Bible, The Qur’an, and The
Tipitaka packed full of narratives, fables, metaphors, myths, analogies, similes, and other imagery in order to teach people
what is the ‘proper way of living’. There are no universal laws on what is
considered ‘right’ and ‘wrong’; well besides the “Golden Rule” of course. A
strong argument could be made that ethics and morals are performed as well as
judged on an individual and case by case basis. Deception is an action that
falls under much scrutiny in ethical and moral realms. “Whereas deception is
typically frowned upon, research shows that people typically lie on a daily
basis and deception is part of everyday life” (Scholl & O’Hair, 2005, pg.
377).
Deception occurring on a “daily basis” is unsettling and an
uncomfortable thing to hear. Nobody wants to live a life of zero trust and
questioning of everything we hear in our daily communications. As I mentioned
in an earlier blog on the subject, “communication is founded on the presumption
of truth” (Goffman, 1959). If we assume
and presume that, until otherwise detected, the things we hear from friends,
family, co-workers, and our significant other(s) are of the truth, then these
relationships can remain healthy and not full of doubt, cynicism, and
suspicion. However, we as listeners and receivers of information have
relatively no control over what is said to us and how it is presented. This
task is performed by the sender and that puts the transmitter of information in
a position of power; power over the control of said information. But, like Stan
Lee, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Winston Churchill and originally Voltaire stated,
“With great power, comes great responsibility”. The responsibility in the case
of deception is related to the personal ethics and morals being analyzed,
strategized, and employed by the potential deceiver.
Ethics and morals have been studied and examined since man
began to walk upright and form language. Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) was a German
philosopher that wrote about ethical decisions and there application in
humanity. He argued that it is was
personal and individual responsibility for a person to reason through moral
dilemmas and this must be done with a strong sense of ethical autonomy
(free-will or capacity to act on one’s own behalf and make one’s own
decisions). Kant was a firm believer in deontological ethics or, the normative ethical position that judges the morality
of an action based on the action's adherence to a rule or rules (Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals). Individual ethics are autonomous because
“[ethical decision making] cannot be ethical if it is biased by self-interest,
profit, greed, arrogance, or like reason that would promote personal advantage”
(Bowen, 2006, pg. 335). It looks the only way ethical autonomy could apply to
the act of deception would be in the ‘lies to protect’ category. Deceiving
one’s romantic partner in Tim Cole’s (2001) three main categories of romantic
deception; reciprocity, avoiding punishment, and intimacy needs, would not
count as autonomous ethical decisions because they are driven by
self-interests.
Ethics, are one of five factors conceived by Juliann C. Sholl
and Dan O’Hair (2005), that play a part in the use of deception (the others are
upbringing, acceptance, motives and intentionality). The two authors claim
“deception is an emotionally charged issue fueled by debates over when it is
right or wrong “(pg. 380). The question of when using deception is ok or not,
good or bad, right or wrong may be answered with a Utilitarian perspective.
This standpoint holds that, “when we have a choice among actions, we should
pursue the action that promotes the best possible consequences for everyone
involved” (pg. 381). In romantic relationships the utilitarian notions of lies
may be in order to protect feelings, privacy, or even relational satisfaction.
Deception that is performed to facilitate the best potential outcomes for all
parties involved is certainly a moral and ethical dilemma because the person
evaluating the potential deception must personally make the decisions on what is ‘right’
for everyone.
It seems impossible to separate deception and ethics.
Deception is a social ambiguous term and act because it is essentially an
autonomous decision making process left up to the person in evaluation of it.
People decide to deceive one another based on many factors but the execution of
the act and its relevance to right and wrong are completely at the mercy of the
deceiver. We all have, or hopefully all of us, have a pit in the bottom of our
stomachs that is related to our conscious, that signals to us when we may be
doing something that goes against our personal moral code. We as individuals
involved in communication must pay close attention to those feelings in order
to come to individual decisions of what is right and wrong to us. We have to
decide when it may not only be appropriate but even warranted to perform
deception. If when we lay our heads on our pillows to rest at night and that
pit in our stomach keeps us awake with guilty feelings, then maybe we should
find a way fix it through the disclosure of truths. Remember the truth has no
need for justification.
References:
Bowen, S.A.
(2006). Autonomy in communication: Inclusion in strategic management and ethical
decision-making, a comparative case analysis. Journal of Communication Management, Vol. 10, No.4. pp. 330-352.
Kant, I. (1964).
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, HJ. Paton. (Trans), Harper & Row
Publishing, New York, NY, (originally published 1785).
Scholl, J.C.,
O’Hair, D. (2005). Uncovering beliefs about deceptive communication. Communication Quarterly, Vol. 53, No. 3.
pp. 377-399.
Cole, T. (2001).
Lying to the one you love: The use of deception in romantic relationships. Journal of Social and Personal
Relationships, Vol. 18. pp. 107-129.
